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Abstract
We compare the economic efﬁciency of a publicly-owned utility directly
controlled by the government with a publicly-owned utility regulated by a
public utility commission (PUC). Regulation by a PUC is modelled as a
Nash equilibrium of a game between two principals, the government and
the PUC, each of them having control over a subset of decision variables
determining the utility performance. A utility manager, who has private in-
formation over a productivity parameter, is the agent. Comparisons of both
regulatory regimes are made with respect to output, choice of inputs, man-
ager’s information rent and ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Reasons for which the government
should prefer one regulatory regime over the otherare discussed. The recent
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1 Introduction
In recent years, technological progress has considerably reduced the extent of
activities which are considered to be natural monopolies. As a result, entry
restrictions were relaxed in many industries, such as telecommunications, cable
television, natural gas, electricity or mail services. However, in all these indus-
tries, sector-speciﬁc regulation remains, either because parts of their operations
still are natural monopolies or because they are deemed essential, in which case
subsidized prices are insured by regulation for equity purposes.1 Such services
continue to be protected from entry. As there can exist scope economies between
competitive and protected services, price regulation must often apply to ﬁrms that
supply both types of services.
In such a regulatory framework, prices set for protected services are likely
to be routinely contested by both the protected service provider and competitors
on the ground that they involve cross-subsidies at their disadvantage. In many
countries, such charges can be exarcebeted by the fact that the former monopoly
incumbent is a public enterprise, as presumptions of political interferences with
market operations become difﬁcult to eschew. For this reason, governments in
these countries often combine deregulation and measures which signal their com-
mitment to keep public enterprises at arm’s lenght from political interventions:2
these can go from simple accounting rules, such as accounting “separation” of
competitive activities and protected services, to outright privatization.
1For instance, liberalization of telecommunications and postal services are generally accompa-
nied with some form of universal service obligations to insure that high cost customers still get a
minimal service level. Distribution and transport/transmission of natural gas and electricity stay
natural monopolies whether or not competition is allowed in production and supply.
2Furthermore, such measures can be encouraged or imposed by trade agreements.One of these measures, adopted by the government of Quebec for electricity
markets, is to delegate the monitoring of the industry in general and of the public
enterprise in particular to a so-called independent regulatory agency, or public
utility commission (PUC),3 similar to the ones that traditionally oversaw private
natural monopolies in US. This framework has the advantage of being relatively
easy to implement. However, as the government owns the public enterprise and
sets up the agency which regulates the latter, it is not readily clear whether and
how this regulatory framework differs from one where governmentsolely controls
the public enterprise.
This paper presents a microeconomic model which allows to make efﬁciency
comparisons between two regulatory frameworks applied to protected markets of
public enterprises: direct government control, which refers to the case where
government has the power over all decision variables that affect the performance
of the public enterprise, and regulation by a PUC. We ﬁrst develop a principal-
agent model toanalyze allocativeand productiveefﬁciencies of apublic enterprise
which is directly controlled by government. Regulatory reform is then viewed as
the transfer of some decision variables from government to the PUC. A solution
is derived for a game played by the two principals, i.e. the government and the
PUC. A utility manager, who has private information about labor productivity,
acts as a self-interested agent who maximizes her information rent.
In this model, the government can pursue an objective that differs from util-
itarian welfare maximization and use its public enterprise as a policy instrument
to reach its goal. This is in fact why market liberalization requires a signal that
the industry will be regulated at arm’s length. In order to highlight the impact
of PUC regulation on the efﬁciency of the public enterprise, we ﬁrst consider that
the government’s objective remains the same under both regulatory regimes. In
these circumstances, the government prefers direct control, since it can maximize
its objectivefunction using all decision variables. As a result, creation of the PUC
must be caused by external pressure, such as trade agreements. We then look at
3Because the regulatory agency acts as a principal in our model, hereafter, we refer to it as the
public utility commission.
3the possibility that both regimes be operated under different objective functions.
This is to reﬂect a case where the government is forced to change its announced
objective function, but is free to select the regulatory framework. The question is
then whether the PUC becomes a way to circumvent this external pressure.
Our allocation of decision variables between the government and the PUC
follows the distinction made by Laffont and Tirole[7] between internal control
and external control. According to these authors, “internal control is the control
of the ﬁrm’s inputs and cost minimization process”4 while “external control is the
control of all variables that link the ﬁrm with outsiders: consumers (regulation of
prices, quality, product selection, etc.)...”.5 They view a regulated private ﬁrm as
a ﬁrm whose internal control is exercised by shareholders, and external control,
by government. For public enterprises, both external and internal controls are
exercised by government. A natural extension of this analysis to the case of
a regulated public enterprise is to let the PUC exert external control while the
government exerts internal control. This is the way separation of control over
decision variables between the two principals is made in our model.
We assume that all sectors of the economy other than the protected sector,
including the competitive segments of the regulated industry, are perfectly con-
testable. However, pricing of the protected service can induce distortions in other
markets. In order to abstract from the explicit ways these distortions are created
(e.g. cross-subsidies, taxation of competitor’s service) and to focus on a partial
equilibrium for the protected service, we assume that the public enterprise is en-
tirely ﬁnanced by government, on the base of the appropirate shadow price of
public funds, and that it is a price-taker on its competitive segments.
The main results of the model are as follows. When the same objective func-
tion is used under both regulatory regimes, the action of the PUC leads to an
increase of the public enterprise output and to a proﬁt decrease if demand is in-
elastic. Creation of a PUC could then potentially be justiﬁed if the price of the
4Laffont and Tirole [7], p. 86. They cite “inﬂuence on managerial inputs through manage-
rial incentive schemes, intervention in the decisions concerning employment, level and type of
investments, borrowing etc.”, as examples of internal control.
5Laffont and Tirole [7], p. 86.
4protected service was originally higher than the welfare-maximizing price. But
if government preferences are such that the price of the protected service is orig-
inally lower than the welfare-maximizing price, the tendency of the PUC to in-
crease further the output can be used strategically by the government: it can help
circumvent a change of objective function imposed by external pressures in order
to decrease output.
Although, to our knowledge, there exists no economic model which analyzes
explicitly the performance of publicly-owned monopolies under various regula-
tory regimes, models have already been built in order to compare the efﬁciency
of directly controlled publicly-owned monopolies to the efﬁciency of regulated
private monopolies.6 Our treatment of direct government control closely follows
Pint’s model[10] with two exceptions. First, our speciﬁcation of the manager’s
compensation scheme is less elaborate than in Pint. This simpliﬁes the model
without losing anyinsight on productiveor allocativeefﬁciency. The model could
be extended to include Pint’s compensation scheme without modifying the results.
Second, contrary to Pint, the government does not value employment wages in its
objective function; i.e. it does not wish to use its public enterprise to spur em-
ployment. This also allows to simplify considerably the presentation without
modifying the structure and the basic logic of the model. However, it should be
noticed that the results derived here would change if a sufﬁciently high weight
were given to labor wages in the government’s objectivefunction: the PUC would
tend to decrease output and, with an inelastic demand, to increase proﬁt.7
Note also that in our model, contrary to most models in the literature, we
assume that the PUC does not improvethe government’sinformation on the ﬁrm’s
cost or productivity. This allows us to focus on the impact of separating decision
variables between the government and the PUC. This assumption can be justiﬁed
by the fact that, as a shareholder, the government already has the right to conduct
inquiries into its enterprise as it sees ﬁt. As a result, getting better information
6See Laffont and Tirole[7], Pint[10], De Fraja [5],and Schmidt[11]. There is also a large
empirical literature on this topic, see Bernard and Weiner[4] and references therein.
7Nouhi [9] presents the same model as the one developped in this paper, with the addition of a
labor wage in the government’s objective function.
5from the ﬁrm does not require an independent body as it is the case for a private
ﬁrm; it can be done, for instance, by increasing the staff of the department which
monitors the enterprise.
The next section describes the parts of the model which are common to both
types of regulatory regimes. Sections 3 and 4 then turn to determination of output
and inputs under direct government control and under regulation by a PUC, re-
spectively, assuming that the government objective function stays the same. Sec-
tion 5 looks at the ways the government can use regulation by a PUC to reach
goals that differ from an objective function that is imposed by external pressure.
We illustrate this case with electricity markets in Quebec. By way of conclusion,
we discuss some extensions that could be brought to the model.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Technology, Welfare and Government’s Objective
The government is the sole owner of an enterprise which produces a good accord-





















￿ is labor, and
￿ is a random variable affecting
input productivity. A high
￿ is thus associated with high input productivity. In

















￿ is greater than, equal to, or less than
￿ .
Realizations of the random variable
￿ , as well as the amount of labor em-
ployed, are privately known by the manager of the ﬁrm.8 However, the density
8This assumption is justiﬁed as follows by Pint [10] (p. 134-135): “outsiders observe the
number of workers, but not their quality or the numbers of hours they work.” Efﬁcient usage of
labor can be considered as a management problem. Generally, the existence of a public enterprise
6function
￿ and the distribution function













common knowledge. From (1), we obtain the labor requirement function, i.e. the
minimum amount of labor that is required to produce






































￿ cannot be directly observed by government or the PUC allows







￿ which varies with the reported productivity.9 Because
such payment reduces the proﬁtability of the public enterprise, the government
wishes to keep it as small as possible. Other manager’s compensations which are
not related to the productivity parameter, such as a ﬁxed salary, are set equal to
zero without loss of generality. Similarly, the manager’s reservation utility, which
can be assimilated to her outside opportunities, is also taken to be zero.
Output, capital and proﬁt are observable by the principal(s). For given values
of the observable and the private information variables, consumer surplus and



















































































￿ is the inverse demand function,
I is the price of capital, and
K is the
wage rate (all exogenous to the model). Note that the information rent is deducted
directly from proﬁt. This accounting convention is adopted because the informa-
tion rent constitutes an incentive payment to the manager and thus reduces the
beneﬁts of owning the enterprise. However, as long as the same weight is given
to the information rent and other input costs, it would be equivalent to keep sepa-




















is justiﬁed by the fact that the government has neither the time nor the knowledge to tackle such
problems. This amounts to acknowledging an information asymmetry between government and
the public enterprise’s managers.
9This rent can thus be interpreted as a performance-based bonus.
7We assume that consumers’ utility functions are separable in the public enter-
prise’s good and income (which represents “all other goods”) and that they take




























[ is the consumer index,
￿
U





is its income. Because of this quasi-linear form,
Y
U
corresponds to individual consumer’s surplus. Each consumer will see its
income affected by the utility’s proﬁt (deﬁcit) because government acts as a resid-
ual claimant: such proﬁt (deﬁcit) will reduce (increase) taxes levied by govern-
ment and, considering that each dollar of taxation creates a deadweight loss of
\ ,








C . We also assume that the
ﬁrm’s manager is part of the constituency, so that her information rent enters into
the social welfare function. With each consumer getting a given share of proﬁt




































￿ is made only for ease of presentation
of calculations made below.
The government may have political motivations and use the public enterprise
as a policy instrument to reach goals other than welfare maximization. Specif-
ically, government gives a weight










































10Baron [1] shows that such a function can be viewed as a majority-rule equilibrium of a leg-
islature whose members have utility functions that are linear in consumer surplus and proﬁt. He
also shows how to connect these utility functions to constituent interests.
82.2 Manager Behavior
The manager seeks to maximize her utility. This amounts to maximizing the
information rent, since all other components of her compensation are ﬁxed.
In virtue of the revelation principle, a direct mechanism is used.11 The man-
ager is thus asked to report parameter
￿
!
f Depending on her report
g
￿ , she will


















k with the amount of cap-










k . If she reports
g
￿ while the true value of the
parameter is

































































































Then, in order to make the manager truthfully report parameter
￿ (and insure that





































































Thisistheincentivecompatibility(IC) constraint. The followingtwolemmas,
borrowed from Pint (1992), provide operational necessary and sufﬁcient condi-
tions for satisfying this constraint. In the second lemma and later developments,

























whose value can be interpreted as the amount of effective labor, or work, which is
required to produce output
￿ with
￿ units of capital.12














































































































11We will discuss later how the direct mechanism solution can be implemented.
12 This measure of labor, which is independent of the productivity parameter,is to be contrasted

































￿ , which of course decreases
for given
{ and
~ as the productivity parameter increases.















































































































































































































￿ . Since it can be seen from (11) that the rent must be increasing in
￿ and because the government always prefers to minimize the rent payment, these













To understand intuitively why the government must grant an information rent
instead of conceding only the reservation utility, note that the manager, when
faced with the true parameter value


































making her lie apparent. This is so because labor actually employed is unob-
servable by government and because the lower is the productivity parameter, the
higher is the amount of labor required to meet given contract targets. As a re-
sult, by making the government believe that more labor is required than what is
actually needed, the manager can ensure herself a budget that can be used for her
own beneﬁt. More precisely, if government made a priori no provision for an
information rent, it can be seen from (8) that announcing a value
g
￿ lower than the
true value




































































































￿ , we obtain the rate at which this compensation increases
with
￿ , which is exactly equation (11). In other words, in the truthful direct
10mechanism, the government concedes exactly the amount that the manager can
otherwise get by her own means. As its name indicates, the information rent is
then exactly the value to the manager of her superior information.
3 Direct Government Control
3.1 Direct Mechanism
Underaregimeofdirectcontrol,thegovernmentdetermines, foreachcontingency
￿ , the value of output and capital. It seeks to maximize the expected value of































































































































































































































































￿ represents a state variable.
For the moment we neglect constraint (17) and we will check later whether it































































































































































































































































￿ . This solution then























































































































































































































































































￿ is free in this










￿ was not in-
cluded because it is never binding due to equations (16) and (15). Then, from
































































ˆ is necessarily an interior solution.
Note however that an optimal solution may not exist: for instance, if
˜ is sufﬁciently high and if



















conditions become sufﬁcient for a maximum. We do not wish, however,to impose this decreasing
returns to scale condition, since regulated enterprises that are publicly-ownedare often considered
to be natural monopolies.








































￿ . The former condition






˛ . The latter has to checked for each
problem at hand, but we do not write it explicitly, and refer instead to (23), because it does not
convey any interesting economic interpretation.
12To interpret this equation, note that (15) represents the rate at which the man-
ager’s information rent increases with
￿ . Now, suppose that the manager is able
to extract one additional dollar of rent when the parameter value is
￿ . Since the
manager can always “mimic” a ﬁrmof productivity
￿ if the productivityparameter
is higher than
￿ , this additional dollar of rent must also be granted to the manager
whenever the productivity parameter exceeds
￿ . As the net cost to government of
each dollar of rent is













From (21) and (25), we get the marginal rate of substitution of labor for capital









































































would be equal to
K
c
I . However, the government implicitly values
labor differently from market wage
K . To see why, suppose it is decided that one
additional unit of labor is to be used in the event that the productivity parameter

























































￿ . The net marginal cost of labor at
￿ , or the value



































’ . Since the unit











￿ , condition (26) simply states that the MRS should, as
usual, be equalized to the ratio of input values, where the value of labor differs















￿ is unambiguously related to information constraints, hereafter, we refer
to it as the information term.
Turning to allocative efﬁciency, we substitute (25) and (26) into (20) and di-














































































































￿ is the price elasticity of demand. The left-hand side of this equation







" this marginal beneﬁt simply corresponds to marginal revenue. Increasing
b increases the marginal beneﬁt of a given level of output over marginal revenue.




a case which is likely in practice, the marginal beneﬁt is even higher than price.





￿ , so that it
is possible that the public enterprise sells in the inelastic portion of demand.
To provide an interpretation to both terms on the right-hand side of (27), note
that if the public enterprise minimized the cost of producing

































































































































￿ represent input demand functions.17 However, from (26), the

















’ , which we call





























































￿ represent the factor by which government implicit labor wage differs




























































































































































They are obtained from the problem of minimizing cost subject to the Cobb-Douglas function (1).














~ represent the marginal productivities of
labor and capital.




















































Equation (29) can then be used to determine intuitively whether more or less
output is produced in comparison to the welfare-maximizing solution, with or
without private information constraints. For example,18 if government weighs
consumer surplus more heavily than proﬁt (
b
￿
￿ ), marginal beneﬁt of output







￿ will be greater
than the welfare-maximizingsolutionwhere informationconstraints aretaken into
account. However, the output can be greater or less than the welfare-maximizing
solution without constraints. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where technology
is assumed to display increasing returns to scale,
￿
&
￿ is the welfare-maximizing
output subject to information constraints and
￿
&
￿ is the welfare maximizing output






￿ and we see that
￿
« is necessarily greater than
￿
￿ .





ˆ for ease of presentation of the graphic. The same analysis






ˆ , but it would add a marginal beneﬁt function in the ﬁgure, as the
marginal beneﬁt function associated with welfare-maximization would differ from the demand
curve.
15FIGURE 1
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DIRECT CONTROL AND WELFARE
























































One can thus easily perform comparative statics for different weights
b using
graphics such as Figure 1.
3.2 Monotonicity Constraint and Implementation
We now show that the solution developed in the previous sub-section satisﬁes



















￿ is increasing with
￿ . We proceed by proving
ﬁrst that, in conformity with intuition, this solution insures that the higher is input
productivity, the higher is output. We then show that such output monotonicity is
sufﬁcient for the satisfaction of (17). Output monotonicity allows also to imple-
ment the direct mechanism solution by setting up the menu of contracts in terms





















k be a solution of problem (14)-(16). If the




























￿ . Second, a solution of problem (14)-(16) must satisfy conditions













































denominator is negative in virtue of the second-order condition (30).
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, constraint (17) is satisﬁed.





￿ for incentive compatibility is satisﬁed.


































































































































Totally differentiating with respect to



































































































































































positive in virtue of Proposition 1.
The solution found for the relaxed problem (14)-(16) thus satisﬁes constraint
(17). Once this solution is found, one is confronted with implementing it in
practice: it seems unrealistic to expect that the government would ask the public
utility’s managers to “announce their productivity parameter”. Managers should
rather have to commit publicly on reaching a target on one of the observable vari-
ables, such as proﬁt. In the problem considered here, since output increases
17monotonically with the efﬁciency parameter
￿ , the direct mechanism solution can
simply be implemented by asking the manager to announce the output level that




































› . Instead of using the direct mechanism, government can ask




























































Since this menu simply translates the direct revelation menu in function of
output, it should be clear that the choice of the manager will not be modiﬁed:
whenever the productivity parameter is







￿ , i.e. the quan-
tity that corresponds to
￿ in the original menu. This is formally shown in the
following proposition.

























































































￿ represent the information rent under the direct revelationmechanism. Sup-
























￿ and using the fact that










































































































￿ gives to the manager an information rent that is lower









f This is in contradiction with the fact that the
manager seeks to maximize her information rent.
It turns out that output is the only observable variablethat is necessarily mono-




￿ , labor usage
￿ could decrease following a
productivity improvement. As a result, capital usage, which is observable, could
18decrease as well as increase with
￿
D
f Similarly, although we can derive conditions
under which proﬁt is a monotone increasing function of
￿ , the monotonicity of the
proﬁt path cannot be warranted in general. It thus seems that output (or price)
would be the variable around which the menu of contracts should be designed.
This is in line with actual practice, since price is usually the instrument that gov-
ernments use to regulate their public enterprises.19
4 Pricing via a PUC
The creation of a PUC is modeled as an allocation of decision variables between
two principals, the government and the PUC. The PUC is handed control over the
utility’s price (output), which, in the terminology of Laffont and Tirole [7], repre-
sents the only external control variable in our model. In choosing the price, the
PUC has the mandate to give the same weights to consumer and producer surplus
than those formerly given by the government under direct control.20 However,
the PUC does not have to pay any attention to information rents, which remain
the government’s prerogatives. It is assumed that the PUC is dedicated to fulﬁll-
ing its mandate faithfully, i.e. that it does not have a private agenda of its own that
could make it diverge from its stated objective. The government and the PUC
play a Nash game, i.e. both principals take decisions of the other as given. We
thus search for equilibrium values of decision variables.
4.1 Government’s Problem
The stated objective of the government is the same as under direct control, i.e.
the government still wants to maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus,
producer surplus and information rent. However, since it relinquished control
19Governments also issue service or quality standards while setting price, but this is beyond the
scope of this paper as we have (implicitly) assumed a given and homogeneous quality of output.
20Comparing results between direct control and PUC regulation will allow us, in the next sec-
tion, to infer whether government has an interest in modifying the weights when it creates a PUC.
19over output, this is equivalent to minimize output cost, including the net cost to

























































































































































We ignore for the moment constraint (38) and will check later whether it is




as the Hamiltonian for this problem and
￿ as the costate variable, ﬁrst-order con-

























































These, of course, represent the same conditions than those for the correspond-
ing variables in the direct control problem (14)-(16). This means that, if the
government keeps the same weights in its objective function, giving up the output
decision to a PUC does not modify productive efﬁciency.
4.2 PUC’s Problem and Equilibrium
Given the capital-labor ratio determined by the government, the mandate of the
PUC is to maximize the weighted sum of consumer and producer surplus. Since
21Since the second derivative of
















￿ , the objective func-
tion of the government’s problem is concave in
~ and
￿ . Moreover, the labor requirement func-
tion in the state equation is convex in
~ (and
￿ , since
x is independent of
￿ ) while the costate
variable
￿ is negative. As a result, ﬁrst-order conditions are sufﬁcient for a maximum.
20the government remains in charge of managerial incentives, the PUC pays no
attention to the distribution of the information rent between the manager and the






























































































































































































































A Nashequilibrium is obtainedwhen conditions(39)-(41)of the government’s
problem and condition (43)-(44) of the PUC’s problem are satisﬁed simultane-










































































































































In terms of the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost functions deﬁned above, this





































































































From (29) and (46), it can be seen that the difference between the two regula-
tory regimes comes from the way that inputs are valued by government. Under
21direct control, the choice of output by government was determined taking into ac-
count an implicit price of labor of
K
￿ . Here, the PUC determines output with no
consideration of information rents, i.e. the PUC considers that the price of labor
is
K . The only instrument in the hands of government, quantity of capital, must
then be used to cope with the “externalities” of PUC decisions on information
rent. Since the PUC uses
K as the price of labor and since adding one unit of



















￿ for government. From the equilibrium marginal rate of substitution,





- . This is the price of capital used
for choosing output in (47). As a result, relative input prices are the same under
both regulatory regimes, but their absolute prices differ. As shown in section 4.4,
this will have an impact on the choice of output.
4.3 Monotonicity Constraint
The fact that government does not directly control output also has an impact on
the possibility of satisfying the monotonicity constraint. Under direct control,
government could restrain information rent by restraining output, since lower out-
put requires less labor for given capital and productivity parameter. The higher
was the productivity parameter, however, the lesser was the role of output as a














￿ , decreases with
￿ . Combined with the fact that output was less
costly to produce, this led to an increase of production.22 As government does
not directly control output under PUC regulation, containment of the information
rent must be made through the choice of capital. Since the need for rent reduction
is reduced as
￿ increases, it is possible that capital supplied to the ﬁrm is reduced
with increases of
￿ . This can have the perverse effect of having output reductions
with increases of the productivity parameter. Such output reduction can in turn
provoke a violation of the monotonicity constraint (17).
22This can be seen from equation (31).
















































































￿ , is a productivity effect: higher input productivity reduces
cost and favors an increase of production. The second term is an information rent
effect: the decrease of the information term (
￿
† ) reduces the value of a unit of














￿ is thus indeterminate. Intervals of
￿ s over which the hazard
rate increases steeply, so that the information term
￿ decreases rapidly, could well
display output reduction with productivity improvement.
An output reduction with productivity does not violate any constraint as such.
However, it could lead to a reduction in effective labor
q
, i.e. to a violation of
(38), as can be seen from (33). Then, the Nash equilibrium (39)-(41) and (43)
would not be incentive compatible and would have to be modiﬁed over ranges of
productivity parameters for which
q
is decreasing. For this purpose, we ﬁrst note
that whenever
q


































































￿ can be directly seen from (33). Now, writing
§
q









































































Since the last two terms are positive,
§
q
can be negative only if
§
￿ is negative.







































in government’s problem is not satisﬁed. Then the solution has to be adjusted
23To write






# by taking the inverse of the capital



















































































































































































































































￿ , it is also clear from (49) that capital
decreases over this interval. Similarly, we get from (33) that output is decreas-
ing.24





￿ and by conditions (50)-(52) for interval of constant
effective labor.
4.4 Comparisons with Direct Government Control


























￿ is binding. In the following propositions, we assume that
the marginal cost function
￿
1













￿ . This is a slight reinforcement of second-order necessary









be satisﬁed in a
neighborhood of the solution point. We assume that the condition would be met
whatever is the solution to allow for comparative statics.





















. allows for several segments of declining
￿ , this so-














































































































































































































































But this is in contradiction with optimal pricing condition (46) of the PUC prob-
lem.
Turning to input usage, the fact that the marginal rates of substitution are the
same under both regulatory regimes imply that both regimes use the same expan-


























































Proof. This follows from the fact that both regulatory regimes produce on the























We now show that Proposition 3 extends to the cases where, under PUC regu-
lation, the monotonicityconstraint is bindingoverintervalsof productivityparam-
eters. This result follows from the fact that, with an increasing hazard rate, output
always increases with
￿ under direct governmentalcontrol, while it decreases with

















































































































































































































































25The next proposition simply combines the preceding results on cases of non-
binding and binding monotonicity constraint in order to compare the complete
output paths of the two regulatory regimes.




















￿ and that the hazard rate is








































































However, Corollary 2 remains true only for labor usage. Results on capital are
not maintained because regulatory regimes do not operate on the same expansion
path when the monotoncity constraint is binding.




















￿ and that the hazard rate is mono-








































￿ , the result follows directly from Corollary





































￿ . By def-
inition of
q









































































































































































































































Because we are not able to derive similar results for the capital paths, we
cannot infer general results on whether expected costs of production is higher
or lower under one regulatory regime compared to the other. Consequently, we
cannot compare both regimes in terms of proﬁt. The difﬁculty arises when the
monotonicity constraint is binding; otherwise, the results on labor paths would
carry over capital paths, as was shown in Corollary 2. However, intervals of bind-
ing monotonicity constraints also bring implementation problems, as we discuss
26in the next sub-section. Tackling these implementation issues, as we do in sec-
tions 4.5 and 4.6, will turn out to allow meaningful comparisons between capital
paths and as a result, between values of the government’s objective function.
4.5 Implementation
Because an incentivecompatible Nash equilibrium does not warrant monotonicity





















of these variables can be used to implement the direct mechanism outcome. The
only variable that can be used is the information rent of the manager. In principle
then, the menu of contracts could be designed in terms of the information rent,
i.e. the manager could be asked to announce her information rent. This could be
consideredas anagreementontheperformance-basedbonusgiventothemanager.

















































However, the solution could be politically difﬁcult to implement for two rea-
sons. First, it seems odd to have a regulatory agency focusing hearings on the
determination of the overall compensation of managers, especially when internal
control is considered the prerogative of government. Second, the resulting menu
could allow for output reductions with productivity improvements. This would
typically encounter political resistance and it is dubious that the government or
the PUC could make a credible commitment to such a solution: once it is known
that the utility operates under a relatively high productivity parameter, the PUC
would certainly be pressured by consumer groups to keep the output price at least
as low as when the productivity parameter is low. In other words, it appears un-
acceptable to sustain a situation where consumers turn out to lose from the ﬁrm’s
productivity improvements.
For these reasons, the next section analyzes a solution where output is con-
strained to increase with the productivity parameter. This is sufﬁcient (but not
necessary) to meet constraint (38). Forcing the output function to be monotonic
will also allow the PUC to write the menu of contracts in terms of output, or price,
which seems more realistic than using manager’s compensation.
274.6 Constraint on Output Monotonicity













￿ is the same as the one presented for the labor monotonicity con-
straint in the preceding section and in Appendix C. Appendix D presents detailed



































































































































































































































￿ . We can then restate Proposition 5 for the case where an output
monotonicity constraint is imposed.











































































￿ and the result is ob-


















































































































































































Contrary to the case where the monotonicity constraint is imposed on effec-
tive labor, ﬁrst-order conditions (39)-(41) remain unchanged whether the output
monotonicity constraint is binding or not. As a result, the marginal rate of substi-
tution under PUC regulation will be the same as under direct government control,
whatever is the productivity parameter. This feature allows us to obtain stronger
results on capital paths, and consequently, on proﬁt.






























































Proof. This follows from the fact that both regulatory regimes produce on the























Since information rents are directly related to labor usage, it follows from
Corollary 4 that they are higher with PUC regulation than under direct control.
Together with the fact that more of both inputs are used, this means that expected
costofproductionishigherwiththepresenceofaPUC. Ifdemandiselastic,proﬁt
will be lower only if the gain of revenue is less than the cost increase. However,




it is possible that the production takes place in the inelastic portion of demand.


















































































































under regulation by a PUC and under direct control, respectively.

































































































































« are the manager’s information rents under PUC regulation






















In general, the relative performance of both regimes are driven only by the
fact that the government and the PUC have different perceptions of the absolute
29prices of labor and capital. Under direct control, government considers implicitly




















- . Relative prices being the same, this does not impact
on productive efﬁciency. The high implicit labor price of direct control tends to
decrease output,25 while the low implicit capital price of PUC regulation tends to
increase it.
5 Choice of Regulatory Regime by Government
In the previous section, comparisons of regulatory regimes were made under the
assumption that the weights given to consumer surplus and proﬁt in the govern-
ment’s objective function were the same under both regimes. Under such an
assumption, it is clear that the government prefers direct control over PUC regula-
tion: with direct control, it can maximize its objective function using all decision
variables, while it loses control over output under PUC regulation. PUC reg-
ulation should thus be observed only if the government cannot freely pursue its
objective.
Governmentscan be restrained in the regulation of a giveneconomic sector ei-
ther by the country’s constitution, by national laws governing economic activities
in general, or by bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Trade agreements,
in particular, have limited signiﬁcantly the power of governments to intervene in
markets for the last 10 or 15 years. In our model, such external constraints can
be interpreted as an obligation for government to explicitly or implicitly put a
weight on consumer surplus that differs from the one that it would choose to use,
i.e. to adopt an objective function that does not represent its true preferences. In
this section, we illustrate two cases where the creation of the PUC is susceptible to
follow from external pressure, such as trade agreements, on government. We then
illustrate the model with the regulatory reform of electricity markets in Quebec.
25Whether output is too high or too low compared to ﬁrst best solution also depends, however,
on the marginal beneﬁt function.
305.1 PUC as a Constraint on Government
As the PUC tends to increase the production of the industry, its creation can in-
crease welfare in the case where the government puts a weight
b on consumer










￿ . This would be the case where the gov-
ernment wants to use the protected sector of its public enterprise to ﬁnance other
governmental activities or competitive activities of the same enterprise.26 If ex-
ternal pressure cannot impose an objectivefunction to government, it can then ask
for the creation of an independent regulatory body, such as the PUC. Alterna-
tively, if government cannot credibly commit to increase its weight on consumer
surplus while holding control of the public enterprise, creation of the PUC can
signal such a commitment.
Figure 2 illustrates27 this point. If government is free to choose its objective
function, it puts a weight equal to
b on consumer surplus and opts for direct con-









￿ . With the same information



















￿ . A PUC
would operate as if marginal cost was given by the
￿
1







































￿ and if the
welfare function is strictly concave, welfare would unambiguously increase. This
is a case where external pressure would prefer regulation by a PUC than direct
control for this precise value of
￿ .
26For example, provincial governments in Canada own public monopolies in alcohol distribu-
tions. Some of these public enterprises have been accused of subsidizing its activities in compet-
itive sectors of the industry, such as wine bottling, with the surpluses generated in the protected
distribution sector.














































































































































































￿ , in which case it is not clear whether
welfare is greater under regulation by a PUC or not. This overshooting is the











- . This is intuitive: the closer are govern-
ment’s preferences to welfare maximization, the less likely the distortions created











































































5.2 PUC as an Instrument for Softening Constraints




￿ . In suchacase, the protectedsector issubsidized underdirect
control as the price is lower than marginal cost. We assume that external pressure
is able to require government to keep its weight on consumers’ surplus equal to or
32less than 1,28 but that it cannot impose the regulatory framework. To insure that
the objective function of the government is strictly concave, we also assume that
the enterprise experiences decreasing returns to scale. The same results hold with
increasing returns to scale with the caveat that one has to check whether “moving”
from one output level towards the government’s preferred output really increases
government’s objective function: this is not always the case because the function
is not necessarily everywhere concave.




￿ , which corresponds to its preferences, and opts for direct control.
For agivenvalue of









￿ , its preferred solution. Forcing




to force it to consider the inverse demand curve as its marginal beneﬁt curve.

















































￿ , government prefers
PUC regulation for this particular
￿ since the objective function is strictly concave




















￿ , it is not clear which regulatory regime would be preferred for this
￿ ,
since one of themleads to overproductioncompared to the government’spreferred
solution, while the other leads to underproduction.
28Trade agreements generally include provisions for precluding outright subsidization of indus-
tries.
33FIGURE 3













































































































































































This depends on the actual parameters of the problem. However, it is clear that
the higher is
b , i.e. the “farther apart” is the marginal beneﬁt curve from the de-
mand curve, the more likely is PUC regulation as a way to circumvent external
constraints.
5.3 Illustration: Electricity Markets in Quebec
In December 1996, the provincial government of Quebec adopted a law creat-
ing a public utility commission which received the mandate, among other things,
to regulate electricity rates in Quebec. Most of electricity used in Quebec is
produced by a publicly-owned utility, Hydro-Quebec. However, to help Hydro-
Quebec get a licence to participate in the US competitive wholesale markets, the
34Government of Quebec has opened access to the utility’s transmission grid for
transborder wholesale transactions. Hydro-Quebec also introduced separate ac-
counting for generation, transmission and distribution and delegated management
of its transmission assets to a division, whose activities are deemed independent
from the rest of the corporation. This division is legally forbidden to practice
price discrimination, in the sense that it must charge the same unit price29 for all
transmission services, regardless of the speciﬁc user. Hydro-Quebec maintains
its monopoly in distribution and in domestic wholesale supply. However, govern-
ment delegated pricing authority to the PUC for these protected sectors30 as well
as for the transmission network.
Before this regulatory reform, there was no independent regulatory overview
of Hydro-Quebec and rates were directly approved by the governmentafter a pub-
lic examination by a commission of the public legislature. Combined with access
to hydro resources, this regulatory framework has made Hydro-Quebec’s rates
among the lowest in the world. Accordingly, rates of return on equity have been
dismal: from 1989 to 1995 the nominal rates of return ranged from 3.3 per cent to
8.4 per cent, rates that are roughly equal to treasury bill rates of return. In fact,
Quebec has the capacity to keep low electricity rates without having accounting
deﬁcits: this is because 95% of electric energy is produced from hydraulic re-
sources and production sites have been developed in ascending order of costs.
Through ownership of Hydro-Quebec, the government could thus enjoy an im-
portant Ricardian rent, but has always dissipated it through electricity rates below
marginal cost. Bernard and Chatel [2] have estimated that the application of
marginal cost pricing instead of the observed price, approximately based on av-
erage cost, would have increased social welfare by C$270 to C$530 million per
year, in constant 1980 Canadian dollars. Bernard and Roland [3] have shown that
this propensity to dissipate rent is consistent with a majority-rule equilibrium.
29This price is to be set by the PUC.
30This is to be contrasted with France which, as a way to comply with an EU directive on third-
party access to transmission network, had announced the creation of a PUC which will regulate
only the price of transmission. Distribution prices for protected services will continue to be part
of a service agreement between the publicly-owned utility and the government.
35Such pricing policy and its ensuing welfare loss shows that the government
did not maximize welfare and rather preferred to favor the electricity customers
at the expense of the public utility proﬁt. In terms of our model, this hints at a
relatively high weight
b in the government’s objective function. However, one
can wonder why such a politically popular policy has not been maintained. In
fact, in spite of the worldwide trend of electricity market restructuring, there was
no internal pressure for reform. The government’s motivation was rather to in-
sure that Hydro-Quebec met US regulators’ criteria to be an eligible seller on US
wholesale markets, while minimizing the impact on the domestic market. This
was shown, in particular by efforts made by the government to convince domestic
consumers that prices would be maintained low in Quebec31 and that there was no
plan for privatizing Hydro-Quebec in whole or in part.
Nevertheless, US regulators required only warranties for non-discriminatory
access to Quebec’s transmission network. There was then no formal obligation
to create the PUC. Furthermore, if the aim of creating the PUC were strictly
to signal non-intervention in transmission pricing, the mandate of the PUC could
havebeenlimitedtothetransmissionsegmentofthemarket. Asexperienceshows
that government of Quebec puts a weight greater than
￿ on consumer surplus and
since the Quebec hydro-electric system operates under decreasing returns to scale,
it seems that Figure 3 would apply to Quebec electricity markets. This would
suggest that the PUC was created in order to maintain the lowest prices possible
in domestic markets.
6 Conclusion
When the presence of the PUCdoes notimproveinformation to government,split-
ting decision variables between two principals increases the cost of limiting the
information rent to the ﬁrm’s manager. As a result, the information rent will be
31While the government delegated price authority to the PUC, both the government and Hydro-
Québec made the commitment to freeze rates for a period of 4 years, i.e. to refrain from asking
the PUC to increase rates over the period.
36allowed to be greater with a PUC than under direct control and, since this infor-
mation rent is positively correlated to output, this will also lead to an increase of
output. There is thus an inherent inefﬁciency in PUC regulation, and the govern-
ment would never resort to it if its objective were to maximize welfare.
However, this tendency of PUC regulation to increase output could prove at-
tractive when the government’s objective differs from welfare maximization and
when the government is not entirely free of its choices for any reasons, such as
constitutional restrictions or trade agreements. We used two cases to illustrate
this point. First, if the government’s objective is such that output is lower than
the welfare-maximizing one, creation of a PUC could be externally imposed on
the government in order to rectify its bias for low output. On the contrary, if
the government prefers an higher output than the welfare-maximizing one, the
creation of the PUC could be used to soften constraints that would be externally
imposed.
A number of extensions should be brought to our analysis. First, as Pint
(1991) already made comparisons between a directly controlled public monopoly
and a regulated private monopoly, there remains the task of comparing a regulated
public monopoly with a private one. From the results of Pint, it can already be
inferred that, under regulation by a PUC, a public enterprise would differ from a
private one not only with respect to allocative efﬁciency, but also in productive
efﬁciency.
Second, in line with most of the principal-agent literature, it would be interest-
ing to consider that the PUC (i) improvesthe information availableto government,
but (ii) has interests of its own that differ from those of the government. Conse-
quently, the PUC would try to beneﬁt from the information it gathers and would
be able to extract an information rent in the same way the manager does. This
could eventually result in coalition between the PUC and the utility. Such an
extension could possibly draw on the work of Laffont and Tirole [6].
37Appendices





































































































Incentive compatibility means that the manager has an interest in truthfully
reporting the parameter
￿ . This can be true only if the utility of the manager is






























































































Reversing the roles of
￿ and
g



































































































































































































































































































































32Appendices A and B are based upon Pint[10].
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C Binding Labor Monotonicity Constraint
In this Appendix, we explicitly take into account constraint (38) while solving
problem (35). As the solution over intervals of
￿ for which the constraint is not
binding is explicitly derived in the main text, we focus here on intervals for which
the constraint is binding.
The treatment here differs from the one in main text in two respects: ﬁrst,
since the constraint applies on effective labor
q
rather than nominal labor
￿ , we
solve this problem in terms of
q
. The solution for










. Second, rather than solving for capital












￿ deﬁned in (10), we solve for
q
and then
deduct the required capital for producing output
￿ . This is again because the
constraint applies directly on
q
, while capital usage is unconstrained. The capital






































￿ as a state vari-















￿ , which becomes the control variable.









































































































































denote the “constrained” government problem under
PUC regulation and denoting by
E the costate variable associated with constraint















































































































































































































































33The treatment here follows Laffont and Tirole [8], section A1.5.











































































































































































































Note that this condition can easily be related to condition (40): while this
latter required that the integrand of (81) be equaled to zero for each
￿ , here it is








’ , over which effective
labor is ﬁxed.
D Binding Output Monotonicity Constraint
In this Appendix, we include an output monotonicity constraint in the PUC prob-
























￿ as the control




























































































































































￿ be the co-state variable associated with (82), we can write the







































































































































































































































































































































































which is equation (53) in the main text.
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